Brief Summary: Appellant appealed a lower court decision where it found for Plaintiff. On appeal, appellant argued that the underlying contract violated the statute of frauds and that an alteration to the deed after grantor signed voided the deed. The appellate court found the statute of frauds did not apply and upon first impression, names added to a deed after execution did not violate the original deed. Further, the lower court properly allowed in evidence even though it was not produced during discovery. The lower court decision was affirmed.

Case Summary: In 1985, a family collectively purchased five acres of land. Appellant owned 50% interest in one lot. In 1998, appellant wanted to sell his interest in the property. His uncle raised $50,000. After appellant received the money, his name remained on the property because his relatives felt appellant’s command of English benefited the family.

In 2002, appellant faced a lawsuit and sought to remove his name from the property to protect it. Appellant conveyed the property as a “gift” to Fue, his uncle’s daughter. However, after Fue signed the quit claim deed, someone added two additional names to the deed.

In 2005, appellant had Fue execute a deed reconveying the property. Fue sued. At trial, the court found that the payment of $50,000 consisted of a buy out of appellant’s interest and the conveyance was voided as to the added names.

Appellant appealed on the grounds that the original offer to sell was not in writing and violated the statutes of fraud and the altered deed should void the deed all together.

The statutes of fraud requires some form of writing when a contract is entered into for the sale of real property. Civ. Code §1624(a). The statute, however, applies primarily for evidentiary purposes. Sterling v. Taylor (2007) 40 Cal.4th 757, 766. It does not apply to executed agreements. Kirkpatrick v. Tapo Oil Co. (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 404, 414.

At trial, parties did not dispute that appellant executed a grant deed in 2002. Because of the execution, application of the statute of frauds is in appropriate. The lower court correctly rejected appellants argument.

The court addresses the issue of names being added after the execution of a deed on first impression. Courts in the past have held where a deed is altered without grantor’s consent prior to execution, the deed is void. Montgomery v. Bank of America (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 559, 563. However, that did not happen under the current facts.

Instead, a closer analogy occurs when a trustee alters a formerly executed deed. Instead of invalidating the deed, only the new alteration becomes invalid. Bumb v. Bennett (1958) 51 Cal.2d 294, 303. Similar with contrats; when a third party alters an existing contract, the contract remains valid while the modifications are deemed void. Walsh v. Hunt (1898) 120 Cal. 46, 53.

In the current case, someone modified the deed after its execution. Because parties properly executed the original deed, the modification should not invalidate it, instead, the lower court correctly voided the modifications while preserving the original deed.

Finally, at trial, plaintiff’s presented evidence that appellant did not receive during discovery. Appellant objected to its admission. Trial court overruled and allowed the submission of the evidence. On appeal, appellant argued the court exceeded its discretion by allowing in the evidence.

A trial court may sanction any party who misuses the discovery process by withholding evidence. Code of Civ. Pro. §2023.030(c). For the sanctions to apply the non-producing party must willfully violate a court order. Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327. Further, the trial court has broad discretion and such discretion will not be disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of reason. Pratt v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 165, 183.

In the court proceedings, appellant never obtained a court order demanding the evidence. The appellant also failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s willfully failed to produce the evidence. Because appellant could not meet the basic threshold to have the court withhold the evidence, the court properly allowed it.

The lower court correctly determined that the appellant did sell his interest in the property and the deed was valid. Without any showing of violation of evidentiary rules, the appellate court affirmed the lower decision.