Summary: Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants. Defendants responded by answering and filing an anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to the anti-SLAP. Defendants then moved to have the court grant their motion based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond. The day before the anti-SLAPP hearing, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the case without prejudice.
At the hearing, the trial court stated Plaintiff’s dismissal did not forebear the court from hearing the anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff presented an oral argument and requested an extension to properly respond to Defendants’ motion. The court denied Plaintiff’s request and granted Defendants’ request including attorney fees and deemed Plaintiff’s dismissal moot.
Plaintiff moved for relief pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 473(b). The court denied the motion but granted reconsideration of its decision on the anti-SLAPP motion. In doing so, Plaintiff had an opportunity to respond to the original motion.
Despite the original motion to dismiss filed by Plaintiff, the court heard new arguments related to the anti-SLAPP motion. After the hearing, the court granted Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration and denied Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants appealed the decision.
On appeal, Defendants argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to reconsider the anti-SLAPP motion because Plaintiff filed for a dismissal prior to the initial hearing.
California Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 581(b)-(c), grants a party the right to dismiss an entire cause of action prior to the commencement of trial. The request for dismissal is effective upon filing. Aetna Casualty & Surty Co. v. Humbolt Loaders, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 921, 931. Upon the filing, the court loses jurisdiction over the matter except limited to awarding costs and statutory attorney fees.
The terminology of “commencement of trial” has several interpretations throughout the courts. However, the most persuasive interpretation suggests that voluntary dismissals without prejudice are ineffective where some public or formal indications by the court or some procedural dereliction by the Plaintiff, the dismissal is otherwise inevitable. Franklin Capital Corp. v. Wilson (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.
In an anti-SLAPP suit, the defendant bears the burden of proof. Code Civ. Proc. §425.16(b)(1). Further, the trial court does not weigh the evidence upon initial submission. Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 910. Therefore, a decision is not made by the court on the matter until the hearing.
The anti-SLAPP statutes also anticipate dismissals while pending the hearing. In such situations, the court merely retains jurisdiction to rule on issues of attorney fees, as reserved under Code 581. Pfeiffer Venice Properties v. Bernard (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 211, 218-219.
Here, Plaintiff filed the motion to dismiss prior to the hearing. As the Court did not have time to issue a ruling based upon the information presented by the Defendants, and Defendants had a burden to prove their case regardless of Plaintiff’s failure to respond, the Court did not present any definitive ruling that would prevent the dismissal. Thus, Plaintiff timely filed and the Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on that anti-SLAPP motion. The court does reserve the right to consider awarding costs and statutory attorney fees to Defendants.
The Appellate Court granted Defendants motion to dismiss and had the anti-SLAPP motion vacated. Issues regarding costs and attorney fees were remanded to the lower court.